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Introduction
This study examines developments within environmental policy making in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and is examined along three dimensions:
(i) the historical context; (ii) policy instruments and discourses; and (iii) policy outcomes.
In empirical terms, it asks: (i) can we identify patterns of convergence and/or divergence along these three dimensions between the two countries?; and (ii) to what extent does the European integration process impact upon these patterns? The second question is particularly useful in a comparative context because it also serves to enhance our understanding of the scope and scale of the processes of Europeanization and policy transfer within the United Kingdom, Germany and, by inference, further afield. In theoretical terms it uses an historical institutionalist framework within which to frame the analysis.
The historical institutionalist approach is useful because it provides a macro-level theoretical lens within which it is possible to both embed and problematize the mesolevel concepts of 'Europeanization' and 'policy transfer'. The mechanics of these two concepts are expanded upon elsewhere in this volume. However, let us clarify the study's use of the concept of Europeanization at this point. There is a lively debate within the literature as to whether Europeanization is a 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' process and this debate also touches on the role of intervening variables (nation-specific norms, standard operating procedures) in the process 1 . It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with these debates. It is, however, useful to point out that although reference is made to a bottom-up conception of Europeanization -for instance, with regard to the uploading to the European Union level of German regulatory practices in the 1980s -the study gives more weight to a top-down conception of the process. There are two reasons for this.
First, because the top-down approach explicitly places member states as the 'receivers' of Europeanization, it provides a better framework for concentrating on a comparison of policy practices in the United Kingdom and Germany. Second, the top-down approach complements the historical institutionalist framework in that it requires some degree of institutional 'misfit' at the member state level to exert the adaptational pressures for Europeanization to occur. Again, this allows us to concentrate upon institutional settings in the United Kingdom and Germany. At the same time, however, the study is responsive to criticisms of the top-down approach found in the literature 2 and places significant weight on intervening variables that determine the scope and scale of Europeanization.
the time of institutional formation shape the scope and scale of subsequent developments.
Sometimes, as with the abandonment of Keynesian economic policy in the United
Kingdom after 1976, certain institutions are able to leap free of the shackles of prior
practice and achieve what amounts to a 'paradigm shift' in the substance of policy making 8 . In most cases, however, we see a more prosaic process in which standard operating procedures often inhibit anything more than incremental change. This leads to two possible ideal types of outcome. In one, successful institutions are able to work with the grain of existing procedures, build upon past successes and enhance existing institutional capacity. In the other, poorly performing institutions are unable to achieve a paradigm shift and the subsequent inability to successfully adapt can then lead to further institutional underperformance and policy failure. Most institutions, of course, fall between these two ideal types but, where failure is clearly evident, the ability of institutions to break the cycle is dependant on the configuration of policy goals and discourses within them -and the more contingent phenomenon of whether key institutional agents are able or willing to do so. This is looked in more depth later in the article.
So where does this leave the development of environmental policy in the United
Kingdom and Germany? The historical institutionalist approach requires that current practices in a given policy area are best explained through a reasonably detailed analysis of its development over time. And as we shall see, such an analysis of the institutional development and performance of environmental policy making in the two countries clearly demonstrates (i) significant variance in institutional performance between the two countries; (ii) the persistence of standard operating procedures in both countries; but also indicates (iii) a capacity for learning and adaptation 9 . Nevertheless, and despite the activist role assumed by the European Union within the policy domain, we can identify nation-specific standard operating procedures that persist to the present day. So, let us look at the historical development of each country in turn, before examining the role of the European Union.
The United Kingdom context
In the United Kingdom it is possible to identify the emergence of an environmental policy domain from the early 19 th Century onwards, thus making it the first industrial democracy in which an identifiable environmental policy domain was to develop. As the first country to industrialize, the United Kingdom underwent a process of politicaleconomic, demographic, and physical change that was unprecedented in human history. per cent of the population lived in urban areas 10 . The resulting urban squalor prompted a number of environmental reforms, albeit embedded within a wider policy concern for public health, physical and sometimes even moral, improvement, rather than one explicitly predicated on the idea of environmental sustainability. Given that Victorian
Britain was the exemplar of a strong unitary state, the standard operating procedures established at this time were consistent with a pattern in which a strong central government took limited measures to empower sub-national levels of government in
order to impose what were intended to be broadly uniform (albeit pragmatic and minimalist) standards prescribed by the centre.
As environmental concerns where contingent on the wider set of concerns noted above, it is to be expected that early initiatives were either (i) focused on relatively narrow policy problems; or (ii) nested in legislation that was primarily focused on otheralbeit related -policy concerns. 
The German context
The institutional development of German environmental policy is at least as pathdependant as that of the United Kingdom, although the emergence of a distinct environmental policy domain did not take place until later in the 19 th Century. As noted earlier, the pattern established in the United Kingdom was one in which a strong central government passed legislation intended to both impose standards across the territory of the unitary state and empower sub-national levels of government to work within prescribed parameters in order to further these goals. By contrast, and in keeping with the kind of standard operating procedures associated with federal states, the first institutional feature of note in Germany was that of independent Land involvement, dating back to local ordinances such as the Prussian Gewerbeordnungen.
In the late 19 th Century, the newly united Germany was engaged in a process of economic and military catch-up with the United Kingdom; and in such an atmosphere of national competition, industrial growth and the wider social welfare were considered to be coterminous 17 . As a result, legislation was limited in scope and focused on individual By the mid-1990s, however, Germany's leadership role in the field of environmental policy had come under pressure on three fronts. First, the economic costs of managing the process of German unification had led to a resurgence of worries about
German economic competitiveness amongst elites and had served to erode what had effectively been a decade-long cross party consensus on environmental policy. This manifested itself both within the Bundestag and, with the accession of five relatively poor eastern states, in the Bundesrat. Second, and in response to the economic pressures noted above, the preferences of an enlarged and more socially diverse electorate had shifted away from post-materialist concerns such as environmental protection back towards materialist concerns such as job creation and economic growth. This further constrained the scope of environmental policy innovation elites were prepared to endorse and increased the opportunities for partisan conflict over the issue. Third, not only did the relative lack of domestic consensus on environmental protection at both the elite and mass levels make it harder to articulate German interests in the environmental policy domain at the European Union level, but Germany's ongoing economic difficulties also made it harder to pursue these interests through the use of side-payments to other member states 24 . Nevertheless, if taken in the round, the Federal Republic today still retains an enviable record in most areas of environmental policy -despite its lower profile compared with the 1980s and early 1990s.
The impact of the European Union
From the 1980s onwards the development of environmental policy making in both the United Kingdom and Germany took place within the context of an increasingly assertive European Union level policy agenda. But, although there was a common impact on both countries, the effects of this impact were somewhat different. In other words, as in other policy areas, the scope and scale of the Europeanization of environmental policy making was partly dependant on the level of institutional misfit 25 between the two member states and the European Union. This level of misfit can be conceived as taking place along three dimensions.
The first dimension relates to established standard operating procedures directly associated with the policy domain. Although the dichotomy between environmental 'leaders' and 'laggards' is problematized in the literature 26 , it is clear that those member states that were perceived (or perceived themselves) to be leaders in this regard sought to impose standards as close as possible to their own upon other member states through the medium of the European Union. As a result, at least in the initial period of Europeanization, the adaptive pressures exerted on the United Kingdom (as a perceived 'laggard') were stronger than those felt by Germany (widely regarded at the time as a 'leader'). Before the 1980s, environmental policy was originally very much a 'Cinderella' policy area at the European level and in as far as environmental concerns had any leverage it was as a tangential element to stated Community objectives such as those The third dimension along which Europeanization exerted differential adaptational pressures was the simple one of political salience and its impact upon party political competition. As Wurzel observes, the framing of European Union environmental policy making within a 'quality of life' discourse has been used strategically 'to increase the political legitimacy of the European Union, especially at times of high public environmental awareness' 33 . However, levels of public awareness, the salience it is accorded, the priority it is given over other concerns, and the means with which it is represented within party systems varies across member states. In Germany, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this study, public awareness is high, the issue is given relatively high salience and priority, and Germany's 'multi-member proportional' electoral system allows for the efficient representation of environmental issues, not least through the vehicle of the German Greens, who have been instrumental in bringing issues of environmental protection into the political mainstream 34 . By contrast, in the United Kingdom -and especially in the 1980s -public awareness was lower, prioritization was very low, and the 'first-past-the-post' plurality system prevented the effective representation of such issues by shutting out the Green Party, for instance 35 . At the time of writing, the use of environmentalism as a campaign issue by the Conservative Party has -temporarily at least -led to higher levels of public awareness, issue salience and prioritization, at least in terms of rhetoric. In addition, the introduction of proportional representation for European Parliament elections in the United Kingdom, combined with some success for the Greens in local elections in cities such as Brighton and Sheffield, has enhanced the representation of environmental issues within the party system. It remains to be seen if this is a long-term development, which would surely ease adaptational pressures on the United Kingdom, or if eventually the status quo ante will be restored.
Policy instruments and discourses
In this section we compare and contrast the 'styles' of environmental policy making in the United Kingdom and Germany, with an emphasis on the instruments used by policy makers and the types of policy discourses in which these instruments are selected and justified. Let us turn first to the use of policy instruments.
There are three broad categories of policy instrument. First, there are the classic command-and-control regulatory instruments. In addition, however, internationally we have seen the emergence in the last few decades of two additional types of so-called 'new' environmental policy instruments. The first of these are voluntary agreements, ranging from informal methods (e.g. eco-labelling, encouraging re-cycling, and other lifestyle changes) to more formal instruments such as the International Standards Organisation (ISO 14001), which provides environmental management system benchmarks. The second type of these new instruments are market-based instruments, which can be further divided into two categories: first, rights-based mechanisms, such as tradeable permits and quotas, and, second, 'green' or 'eco' taxes.
Policy instruments and discourses in the United Kingdom
As already noted, environmental policy making in the United Kingdom has traditionally been characterised by a piecemeal approach, in which a unitary state has overseen the activities of subordinate tiers of sub-national government, as well as a fragmented mosaic of national-level ministries, agencies, and quangos. The style of policy making has been embedded in the British tradition of empiricism and problem-solving and where abstract policy principles have existed, these have been as much implied as made explicit. Whilst all this is true, of course, it would be a mistake to over-state such nation-specific characteristics. Thus, whilst there are clear differences between national policy making styles and standard operating procedures, the reductio ad absurdum of such an analytical position. -of national policy styles that are effectively prisoners of path-dependence, with little or no capacity to learn or adapt -is not particularly helpful. As touched upon earlier in this study, the environmental policy community in the United Kingdom has clearly learned and adapted in recent years. Let us now examine the mix of policy instruments and discourses that characterise United Kingdom environmental policy making today.
As described in the previous section, the United Kingdom has a long history of environmental regulation, dating back to the mid-19 th Century. At the same time, however, although we often refer to regulatory instruments as 'command-and-control' measures, the capacity of United Kingdom policy makers to do so was constrained by a distinctive approach to the mechanics of regulation. 
Policy instruments and discourses in Germany
As The move to phase out nuclear power was a paradigmatic example of Germany's long-established propensity for voluntary agreements made 'in the shadow of the law'. In particular, path-dependency was evident in the use of 'consensus talks' with the nuclear industry in order to establish a timetable for the closing down of reactors. This was a device very similar to the talks on nuclear energy that took place in Lower Saxony during the 1990-1994 Red-Green coalition in that state 43 . The eco-tax, by contrast, was something of a departure from the standard operating procedures of environmental policy making in the Federal Republic. Whereas Germany was an undisputed leader in the use of voluntary and regulatory instruments to pursue environmental ends, the forerunners in the use of eco-taxes were the Scandinavian countries and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. Indeed, by the late 1990s, when it came to the use of eco-taxes, Germany had also fallen behind former environmental laggards such as Britain, as already noted, as well as France, and Italy 44 .
Germany's laggard status in the use of this specific policy instrument is, on the one hand, surprising -especially given the potential environmental benefits of such instruments. The general benefits of eco-taxes have been described above, but the argument in their favour in Germany was augmented by a general perception at the end of the 1990s that non-wage labour costs in the Federal Republic were too high. Thus, it was argued that a revenue-neutral eco-tax could produce a so-called 'double dividend' in Germany, because it would serve to both improve environmental practices and, by shifting the burden of taxation from labour to emissions and resource use, lower nonwage labour costs.
In practice, however, there are a number of reasons why Germany was relatively late in adopting eco-taxes as a major tool of environmental policy. First, as already discussed, once operating procedures are established it is difficult for institutions to transcend them. Thus, for the German environmental policy community, when a new or persistent environmental problem is identified, the instinct is to reach for the tried-andtested toolkit of existing instruments. In Germany, this tendency was further aggravated by the fact that internal and external perceptions of existing policy performance were favourable, so there were no major drivers for change in this respect. And by-and-large this self-regard was justified, although -as is discussed later in the article -in recent years the upward curve of German environmental performance has flattened out. The second reason is that, as noted above, eco-taxes go against the grain of some of the Federal Republic's more prized political-economic orthodoxies. No policy instrument is perfect and eco-taxes have been criticized for, for instance, distorting the market, carrying substantial implementation, administrative, monitoring, and transaction costs, and leading to lower revenues over time as agents adjust their behaviour in response to the new market signals 45 . However, the most potent criticism -and one that carried more weight in Germany than the United Kingdom -is that eco-taxes are socially regressive and inevitably punish the poorest members of society, who spend a greater proportion of their household income on energy use. This is consistent with Padgett's findings that demonstrate that in Germany, voters' preferences on welfare issues significantly restrain the use of policy instruments with socially regressive distributionist effects 46 .
Although not socially regressive in the manner of eco-taxes, a general distaste for the instrumentalization of environmental policy can also be detected in the German environmental policy community's resistance to the use of rights-based mechanisms such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. German performance under the new scheme has recently been subject to close scrutiny and the German government has been criticised for being too generous in its initial allocation of allowances -resulting in its running a surplus of allowances and contributing to a fall in the effective price of carbon 47 . It remains to be seen if this policy failure was the result of misfit between the national and European levels of governance or of a more cynical over-estimation of future emissions in order to generate surplus allowances to be traded across the European Union (and thus provide windfall profits for German industry).
Policy outcomes
As Jörgens observes, the debate about policy diffusion has tended to focus on the impact of policy instruments on outputs 48 . Ultimately, however, the test of the effectiveness of policy instruments lies in their impact upon policy outcomes. Yet making outcomes the dependant variable in our analysis is no simple task. On the one hand, we can identify countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands that have embraced the full array of new environmental policy instruments -including market-based instruments -and are regarded as environmental leaders. But this does not mean that we can demonstrate with confidence that x (use of new environmental policy instruments) leads to y (enhanced environmental performance).
A comparison of the United Kingdom and Germany such as the one in this study highlights two specific problems in making outcomes the dependant variable. First, the institutional history of the policy sector, and in particular the cumulative impact of standard operating procedures and discourses, serves to both constrain the scope of policy alternatives and also introduces a degree of complexity that makes a simple causal narrative x → y impossible. Second, nation-specific environmental characteristics create different incentive structures in the two countries. As Wurzel points out, Germany is subject to significantly higher levels of ecological vulnerability than the United Kingdom.
Germany shares land borders with nine other states, has rivers (such as the Elbe and the Rhine) that originate outside its territory and are often slow-flowing, and is a major north-south and (since the collapse of communism) east-west transit country. The United Kingdom, by contrast, is situated on two North Sea islands, shares one land-border (with the Republic of Ireland), has relatively short fast-flowing rivers that originate within the territory, and is not a significant transit country (apart from air travel). In addition, the effects of strong winds and what Wurzel calls the 'scouring sea' help to disperse air and water pollution 49 . These benign environmental characteristics have meant that the United Kingdom has been slower to react to the problems of managing the environmental commons. The United Kingdom has not been subject to significant trans-boundary pollution from its neighbours and over the years became too reliant on the carrying capacity of the environment. Thus, environmentally damaging policies such as those of 'high chimneys' and 'long sea outfalls' went unchallenged for longer than was practically or politically possible in Germany.
Taken together, these different levels of ecological vulnerability mean that the United Kingdom and Germany start from different baselines in terms of both the (real and perceived) severity of environmental problems and the incentives to tackle them. Yet, some degree of rough comparison between the two countries is still possible. As has been discussed earlier in this study, the United Kingdom is not necessarily the environmental laggard that it was twenty years ago and in many ways it is ahead of Germany in its use of new economic policy instruments, especially market-based instruments. But, unlike the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, it still lags behind Germany in terms of outcomes. Thus, Germany still has the highest number of low-emission cars in Europe, the highest proportional use of lead-free petrol, and retains some of the most stringent emission limits. Germany remains a global leader in sewage purification technology, in controlling dioxin emissions, and in research and development in the field of renewables.
Indeed, its capacity for wind-generated electricity now exceeds the United Kingdom's nuclear-generated capacity and it is expected that German photo-voltaic capacity will soon do the same. In addition, Germany continues to take an active role in international By contrast, the United Kingdom has embraced market-based instruments but its failure to seriously invest in renewables is now beginning to look like a strategic mistake.
With rising oil and gas prices, diminishing and unpredictable supply, and the practical and political constraints on any replacement for the United Kingdom's ageing nuclear plant, it remains to be seen how serious a mistake this really is. What can be deduced from the United Kingdom's relatively poor performance in the field of renewables is that agents will react to market signals within the energy market and, in order to foster renewables, the signals required must be strong enough to offset short-term incentives such as those that underpinned the 'dash for gas' in the 1990s. Yet in order to do so, a degree of old-fashioned command-and-control regulation is necessary and, in this, Germany remains more effective than the United Kingdom in establishing the incentive structures that make long-term investment in renewables worthwhile. In short, in the United Kingdom there has seen an over-reliance upon market forces and insufficient recognition of the consequences of market failure. 
Conclusions
This study has examined developments within the environmental policy domain in the In terms of policy instruments and discourses, the study demonstrates how nationspecific patterns remain central. Finally, as noted in the previous section, we can discern a strong variance in the environmental outcomes between the two countries; although, for reasons already described, it is of little value trying to ascribe a simplistic causality to the relationship between standard operating procedures and outcomes.
So we have established significant levels of variance across the three dimensions.
This study, however, has also identified instances of policy diffusion and adaptation, particularly by the United Kingdom. For instance, the old light-touch 'informal, accommodative' style of regulation 58 has been replaced by a more transparent, armslength and potentially conflictual regulatory style. Moreover, after early resistance to market-based instruments, the United Kingdom has become an enthusiastic advocate of this type of new environmental policy instruments. Germany, by contrast, has a long history of voluntary agreements but has been far more resistant to market-based instruments. So, in answer to our first question, although all European Union countries have widened their portfolio of policy instruments, one must conclude that there has been only limited convergence between the United Kingdom and Germany. This is not to argue that there cannot be such a process of convergence and Wurzel 59 , in particular, makes a strong case for the combination of United Kingdom-style pragmatism and German abstraction. Nevertheless, at present such a synthesis has not taken place in any meaningful way.
Paradoxically, one of the reasons for this is found in the development of environmental policy competences at the European Union level. As already noted, from the mid-1980s the European Union became increasingly assertive in the development of environmental policy making. However, although in the early years Germany was relatively successful in uploading policy principles to the European Union level, from the mid-1990s it increasingly found itself working against the grain of developments at the European Union level. By contrast, after an initial period in which the United Kingdom was embattled at the European Union level, the level of 'misfit' 60 between United Kingdom and European Union policy making has eased.
It will be recalled that this misfit took place along three dimensions: (i) established standard operating procedures directly associated with the policy domain; (ii) governance structures; and (iii) political salience and party political competition. And as has already been discussed, the strength of adaptional pressures varies across them. In terms of standard operating procedures, the shift at the European Union level towards a mix of economic instruments and so-called 'soft law' 61 is closer to United Kingdom practices and preferences. At the same time, the emergence of multi-level governance within the sector has challenged the gatekeeper status of the United Kingdom core executive. Finally, in terms of political salience and party political competition, it remains to be seen whether the recent (re)emergence of the environment as key concern in United Kingdom party political discourse represents a substantive shift by the United Kingdom along this dimension. What is clear, however, is that the shift away from command-and-control measures towards market-based instruments -but crucially combined with the soft law approach -provides a challenge to our understanding of the scope and scale of the processes of Europeanization and policy transfer. In particular, the emphasis on misfit as the sine qua non for Europeanization over-emphasises the topdown effects 62 of engagement with the European Union. This study has worked from the premise that intervening variables such as nation-specific standard operating procedures, norms, and discourses really do determine the scope and scale of Europeanization.
Thus to conclude, it is as much the shift to a soft law approach as it is the emphasis on market-based instruments that has determined the shape of environmental policy making in the United Kingdom and Germany. Soft law approaches still allow policy transfer to take place, but they re-emphasise the role of agency at the national and sub-national level. Moreover, this is a development that impacts upon all policy areas in which the European Union has enjoyed a shared competence and not just that of environmental policy. Given this new emphasis on agency at the member state level, it follows that the relatively recent concept of policy resistance 63 will become an increasingly important analytical tool, both in the study of environmental policy, and in the study of the Europeanization of policy making more broadly defined.
